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WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF THE PROBATE OF A WILL IN ONE STATE,
WHEN IT IS OFFERED FOR ALLOWANCE AND PROBATE IN ANOTHER?
DOES IT BIND IMMOVABLE PROPERTY BEYOND THE TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION OF THE FOREIGN COURT? OR DOES IT LEAVE
THE QUESTIONS OF CAPACITY AND EXECUTION OPEN TO CONTEST
IN THE DOMESTIC TRIBUNALS?
It is sometimes insisted that the foreign probate must be held
conclusive upon general principles of public law.-Another view is
that its conclusiveness is settled by the construction of local statutes,
generally adopted, and with slight diversities of language, substan-
tially the same. A third, and the one most confidently asserted,
fixes its conclusiveness upon the provision of the Constitution of the
United States, touching the degree of faith and credit which are to
be mutually given to the judgments of the courts of the different
States, as that provision has been applied by the act of Congress of
May 26, 1790.
We shall look at these opinions in their order and make some
references to the authorities; not with the notion of any exhaustive
discussion of the subject, but merely to call attention to an impor-
tant and interesting topic, and suggest some of the sources of inquiry
to those who may wish to pursue it farther.
I. Does any fair interpretation of public law support this doctrine
of conclusiveness ?
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THE EFFECT OF THE PROBATE OF A WILL.
Judge Story, in § 18, of his book on the Conflict of Laws, writes:
"The first and most general maxim or proposition, is that which has
been already adverted to, that every nation possesses an exclusive
sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own territory. The direct
consequence of this rule is that the laws of every State affect and
bind directly all property, whether real or personal, within its ter-
ritory; and all persons who are residents within it, whether natural
born persons or aliens; and also all contracts made, or acts done
within it. A State may, therefore, regulate. the manner and cir-
cumstances under which property, whether real or personal, or in
action within it, shall be held, transmitted, bequeathed, transferred,
or enforced ; the condition, capacity, and state of all persons within
it; the validity of contracts, and other acts done within it; the
resulting rights and duties growing out of these contracts and
acts; and the remedies, and modes of administering justice, in all
cases calling for the interposition of its tribunals to protect, and
vindicate, and secure the wholesome agency of its own laws, within
its own domains.
And in § 20-"1 Another maxim or proposition is, that no State
or Nation can, by its laws, affect or bind property out of its own
territory, or bind persons not resident therein."
These principles are elementary, and the most obvious that hu-
man reason, unfettered by artificial modes, could suggest. It is
needless to refer to the unbroken decisions upon this question.
How, then, can a publicist argue that a foreign judgment, proprio
vigore, can have any force, for any purpose, beyond the territory
whose court has pronounced it? Public law is a system of rules
which no supreme power prescribes, because no power exists that
could lend to such a system, so prescribed, any sanction adequate
to save it from universal contempt. These rules have such force
given to them as results from the indulgence of a feeling of comity
between nations, and no more, "It has been thought by some
jurists," continues the same writer, at § 33, "that the term comity
is not sufficiently expressive of the obligation of nations, to give
effect to foreign laws, when they are not prejudicial to their own
rights and interests. And it has been suggested that the doctrine
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rests on a deeper foundation; that it is not so much a matter of
comity or courtesy, as a matter of paramount moral duty. Now,
assuming that such a moral duty does exist, it is clearly one of im-
perfect obligation, like that of beneficence, humanity and charity."
This, however, is reasoning in a circle. Laws of imperfect
obligation are so called, by writers upon ethics, because they cannot
be enforced. So with those which claim attention upon the ground
of comity. All results in the forcible conclusion of Judge Story,
at § 23: "And from these two maxims or propositions," (§ 18 and
§ 20) there flows a third, and that is, that whatever force and obli-
gation the laws of one country have in another, depend totally upon
the laws and municipal regulations of the latter; that is to say,
*-upon its own proper jurisprudence and polity, and upon its own
express or tacit consent. * * * * * * When its own code
speaks upon the subject, it must be obeyed by all persons who are
within the reach of its sovereignty."
It is of no moment in this discussion, to settle whether a probate
is or is not a judgment in rem. Various courts have used various
language in regard to the character of this form of proceeding, as
will appear incidentally in the authorities hereafter submitted.
One thing is apparent, that 'uch a judgment cannot have the con-
clusive qualities thus ascribed to it. At common law, in England,
the probate of a will in its appropriate jurisdiction, by an ecclesiastic
Court, had no effect upon the transmission of real estate. Yet, the
Court allowing the probate had passed upon the questions of capacity
and due execution. The English Courts refused to recognize the
validity of a Scotch probate, notwithstanding the same questions
were settled by it; and to pass either real or personal estate, required
the proper proceedings in the domestic Courts. And in numerous
Courts in'this country, from the Supreme Court of the United States,
through nearly the entire series of State Courts, it has been ruled,
that without domestic proof and allowance, a will 6f personalty, to
say nothing of realty, is inoperative, unless some local statute has
provided, for giving it effect. In none of these instances, does it
ever seem to have occurred to any lawyer or judge, that because the
THE EFFECT OF THE PROBATE OF A WILL.
probate was a judgment in rem, it was to be held extra-territorially
binding and conclusive.
And for this omission there was, and is, adequate reason. A
judgment in rem has not, and never had, any such capacity of extra-
territorial expansion. It means, ex vi terminorum, a judgment of
a local nature, designed to settle the status of some party, or deter-
mine the right to some thing, within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Court pronouncing it. It is so in all admiralty proceedings; it
is so in the proceedings of foreign and domestic attachment; it is
so in judgments rendered upon constructive notice, to foreclose
mortgages, and to enforce mechanics' liens; it is so in actions for
divorces. It may well be said that such a judgment is binding
upon all the world. It is binding to the extent of the jurisdiction.
So far as the local Court can pronounce its decree, it ought to be
respected elsewhere. If its process has been levied upon property,
it may condemn and sell the property so levied; if it has acquired
personal jurisdiction of a party, it may determine that person's
status in a proper case; and to the extent of such transfers of title
as follows one class of these acts, or of the condition affirmed by
the other, the adjudication is binding in conscience, and ought to
be respected, and probably would be respected, elsewhere.
It must be conceded that Judge Story, in his discussion of these
subjects, in the work already quoted, was strangely oblivious of this
principle. He says, at § 428 : "The consent of the tribunals, act-
ing under the common law, both in England and America, is, in a
practical sense, absolutely uniform on the same subject. All the
authorities in both countries, so far as they go, recognize the principle
in its fullest extent, that real estate, or immovable property, is
exclusively subject to the laws of the government within whose ter-
ritory it is situate."
Again, at § 474: "We next pass to the consideration of wills
made of immovable property. And there the doctrine is clearly
established at common law, that the law of the place where the
property is locally situate, is to govern, as to the capacity or incapa-
city of fhe testator, to the extent of his power to dispose of the pro-
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perty, and the forms and solemnities to give the will or testament
due attestation and effect." See, also, § 435.
Again, at § 512: "In regard to the title of executors and admin'
istrators, derived from a grant of administration in the country of
the domicil of the deceased, it is to be considered that that title
cannot de jure extend, as a matter of right, beyond the territory
of the government which grants it, and the movable property
therein. As to movable property situate in foreign countries, the
title, if acknowledged at all, is acknowledged ex comitate; and, of
course, is subject to be controlled or modified, as every nation may
think proper, with reference to its own institutions, and its own
policy, and the rights of its own subjects."
Again, at § 539: "No sovereignty can extend its process beyond
its own territorial limits, to subject either persons or property to its
Judicial decisions. Every exertion of authority of this sort beyond
this limit, is a mere nullity, and incapable of binding such persons
or property in any other tribunals."
And at § 551: "In respect to immovable property, every attempt
of any foreign tribunal to found a jurisdiction over it, must, from
the very nature of the case, be entirely nugatory, and its decreS
must be forever incapable of execution in rem.
We proceed to cite some of the authorities illustrative of this
point, beginning with the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States. It will be observed that, in citing an opinion, we
extract from it all that bears upon any branch of our argument;
preferring, for the sake of method in the citations, to refer, in the
subsequent part of the discussion, to those passages having a more
direct relation to the other topics.
Doe vs. McFarland, 9 Oranch, 151. "Letters testamentary give
to the executor no authority to sue for the personal estate of the
testator out of the jurisdiction of the power by which those letters
were granted."
United States vs. Crosby, 7 Cranch, 115. "The question is pre-
sented for consideration, whether the lex loe contractus or the lex
loci rei site is to govern in the disposal of real estates."
"The court entertain no doubt upon the subject; and are clearly
THE EFFECT OF THE PROBATE OF A WILL.
of opinion that the title to land can be acquired and lost only by
the manner prescribed in the law of the place where such land is
situate."
Kerr vs. Moon, 9 Wheat. 565. 1 It is an unquestionable princi-
ple of general law, that the title to, and the disposition of, real es-
tate, must be exclusively subject to the laws of the country where
it is situate."
"If it could be conceded that it were personal property, it would
still be property within the State of Ohio; and we hold it perfectly
clear, that a person claiming under a will proved in one State, can-
not intermeddle with or sue for the effects of a testator in another
State, unless he be permitted to do so by some law of that State."
* * * "The act of 25th January, 1816 (Ohio,) permits au-
thenticated copies of wills, proved according to the laws of any
State of this Union, relating to any estate within that State, to be
offered for probate in the court of the county where the estate lies,
and authorizes the same to be there recorded; and it then proceeds
to declare the effect of such recording to be to render the will good
and valid, as if it had been made in the State, subject, neverthe-
less, to be contested as the original might have been. But it does
not appear that the copy of this will was offered for probate and
admitted to ecord. Had it been so offered, it might have been
contested, and for anything that we can say, the sentence of the
Court of Probate might have been not to admit it to record."
Vaughan vs. Northup, 15 Peters, 1. "Every grant of admin-
istration is strictly confined in its authority and operation to the
limits of the territory of the government which grants it; and does not,
de jure, extend to other countries. It cannot confer, as a matter of
right, any authority to collect assets of the deceased in any other
State; and whatever operation is allowed to it beyond the original
territory of the grant, is a mere matter of comity, which every na-
tion is at liberty to yield or withhold, according to its own policy
and pleasure, with reference to its own institutions, and the inte-
rests of its own citizens. On the other hand the administrator is
exclusively bound to account for all the assets which he receives
under and in virtue of his administration, to the proper tribunals
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of the government from which he derives his authority; and the
tribunals of other States have no right to interfere with or control
the application of those assets, according to the lex loci. Hence,
it has become an established doctrine, that an administrator ap-
pointed in one State, cannot, in his official capacity, sue for any
debts due to his intestate in the Courts of another State; and that
he is not liable to be sued in that capacity in the Courts of the lat-
ter, by any creditor, for any debts due them by his intestate." 1
Cranch, 259; 3 Craunch, 319; 9 Wheat. 565.
fIcCormick vs. Sullivant, 10 Wheat. 192. "The next question is
presented by the answer of Finley. At the death of Win. Craw-
ford, in the year 1782, he was entitled to a certain quantity of land,
to be laid off between the rivers Scioto and Miami, under a pro-
mise contained in an act of the Legislature of Virginia. His inte-
rest in this land was purely an equitable one. After his death, a
warrant to survey the same was granted to John Crawford, his only
son and heir at law, who assigned to one Dyal a certain tract which
had been surveyed under the warrant, and the defendant claims a
part of the tract so surveyed, under Beauchamp, who purchased
from Dyal. He alleges, in his answer, that he made the purchase
bonafide, paid the purchase-money, and obtained a grant for the land,
before he had notice of the will of Mr. Crawford, or of the claim
of his daughters under it."
"Crawford's will, under which the female claimants claim title,
was proved in some Court in the county of Westmoreland, in the
State of Pennsylvania, and was there admitted to record; but it
does not appear, nor is it even alleged to have been at any time
proved in the State of Virginia, or in the State of Ohio, where the
lands in controversy lie."
"At the time of the death of Win. Crawford, lands lying in Vir-
ginia were transmissible by last will and testament, in writing, the
same being signed by the testator, or by some person in his pre-
sence, and by his direction, and if not wholly written by himself,
being tested by two or more credible witnesses, in his presence.
But to give validity and effect to such a will, it was necessary that
it should be duly proved, and admitted to record in the Court of
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the county where the land devised lay, or it might be proved in the
general Court, when the land was of a certain value. *Subsequent
to the death of Win. Crawford, an Act of Assembly was passed,
which permitted authenticated copies of wills, proved in any other
State of the Union, or abroad, to be offered for probate in the gene-
ral Court, or in the Circuit, County, or Corporation Court, where
the whole of the estate lies."
"By the law of the State of Ohio, lands lying in that State may
be devised by last will and testament, in writing; but before such
will can be considered as valid in law, it must be presented to the
Court of Common Pleas of the county where the land lies, for
probate, an& be proved by at least two of the subscribing witnesses.
If the will be proved and recorded in another State, according to
the laws of that State, an authenticated copy of the will may be
offered for probate, in the Court of the county where the land lies,
without proof by the witnesses; but it is liable to contest by the
heir at law, as the original might have been."
"It is an acknowledged principle of law that the title and dispo-
sition of real property are exclusively subject to the laws of the
country where it is situated, which can alone prescribe the mode
by which a title to it can pass fron one person to another. For
the establishment of this doctrine see 7 C. 115; 9 Wheat. 565.
It follows, therefore, that no estate could pass to the daughters of
Win. Crawford, under his will, until the same should be duly
proved according to the laws of Virginia, where the land to which
he was entitled lay at the time of his death, or of the Territory of
Ohio, after the cession by Virginia to the United States, under
the ordinance of Congress of July 13th, 1787, or according to the
law of that State, which has already been recited. The probate of
the will in the State of Pennsylvania gave it no validity whatever
in respect to these lands, as to which this Court is bound to con-
sider Crawford as having died intestate, and consequently they
descended to John Crawford, his only son and heir at law, accord-
ing to the law of Virginia, as it stood in the year 1782."
-Darb~y's Lessee vs. Ma yer, 10 Wheat. 465. "In order to con-
nect herself with the patent, the defendant proved a sale of the
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inchoate interest of John Rice to one Solomon Kitts, and the next
link in his title depended upon the will of Solomon Kitts. To
prove that Kitts devised the land to the trustees, through whom
the defendant made title, a copy and probate of the will was pro-
duced in evidence, duly certified from the Orphans' Court of Balti-
more county, Maryland, in which, it seems, the will had been re-
cently proved and recorded. This evidence was excepted to, but
the Court overruled the exception, and it went to the -jury. The
question is, whether the evidence thus offered was legal evidence of
a devise of land? The common-law doctrine on this subject no one
contests; the ordinary's probate was no evidence of the execution
of the will in ejectment. Where the will itself was in existence,
and could be produced, it was necessary to produce it. When the
will was lost, or could not be procured or produced in evidence,
secondary evidence was necessarily resorted to, according to the
nature of the case. But whatever proof was made, was required to
be made before the Court that tried the cause, the proof before the
ordinary being ex-parte, and the heir at law having had no oppor-
tunity to cross-examine the witnesses; neither were the same solem-
nities required to admit the will to probate as were indispensable to
give it validity as a devise of real estate. At first, it was a ques-
tion of controversy between the common law and Ecclesiastical
Courts, whether a will, containing a devise of land, should not be
precluded from probate, although containing a bequest of person-
alty also. And the question was one of serious import, since the
common-law Courts required the production of the original, whereas
the consequence of probate was, that the original should be con-
signed to the archives of the Court that proved it. This was at
length compromised, and the practice introduced of delivering out
the will, when necessary, upon security to return it. Upon gene-
ral principles, there is no question that lands in Tennessee must, in
all respects, be subject to the land laws of Tennessee. Their laws
affecting devises, and "the rules of their Courts -respecting evidence
in ejectment, must be the law of this case, as far as the Constitution
of the United States does not control the one or the other. With
regard to the modification under which the right of devising may
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be exercised, there is no question that the power of the State is un-
limited, and a will of realty wherever executed, must conform to
the laws of Tennessee. The right of determining whether its laws
have been complied with in this respect, is a necessary result from
the power of passing those laws."
Arm8trong vs. Lear, Adm'r., 12 Wheat. 169. "The bill in this
case is brought against the administrator, with the will annexed, of
General Kosciuszko, for the purpose of establishing a right of the
plaintiff to receive payment out of the assets of the testator, of a
certain bequest to him, contained in a supposed testamentary
writing, executed by the testator at Paris, in France, in June, 1806.
This supposed testamentary writing is set forth in -the bill, and
averred to be in the nature, and of the effect of, a last will or
writing testamentary, but it does not appear to have been admitted
to probate, either in France, or in the proper Orphans' Court of this
District. By the common law, the exclusive right to entertain
jurisdiction over wills of personal estate, belongs exclusively to the
Ecclesiastical Courts, and before any testamentary paper of per-
sonalty can be admitted in evidence, it must receive probate in
these Courts. Lord Kenyon, in the King vs. -Inhabitants of
Nether8eal, 4 Term Rep. 258, said, 'We cannot receive any other
evidence of there being a will in this case, than such as would be
sufficient in all other cases where titles are derived under the will;
and nothing but the probate, or letters of administration, with the
will annexed, are legal evidence of the will in all questions respecting
personalty." This principle of the common law is supposed to be
in force in Maryland, from which this part of the District of Columbia
derives its jurisprudence; and the probate of wills of personalty to
belong exclusively to the proper Orphans' Court here, exercising
ecclesiastical jurisdiction. If this be so, and nothing has been shown
which leads to a different conclusion, then it is indispensable to the
plaintiff's title, to procure, in the first instance, a regular probate of
this testamentary piper in the Orphans' Court of this District, and
to set forth that fact in his bill. The treaty stipulations, the act of
Congress, and the argument attributing to them the full force, which
that argument supposed, to establish the validity of the instrument,
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do not change the forum: which is entitled, by local jurisprudence,
to pronounce upon it as a testamentary paper, and to grant a pro-
bate. It is one thing to possess proofs which may be sufficient to
establish that a testamentary instrument had been executed in a
foreign country, under circumstances which ought to give it legal
effect here; and quite a different thing to ascertain what is a proper
tribunal here, by which those proofs may be examined, for the pur-
pose of pronouncing a judicial sentence therein."
Passing over the cases of Carmichal vs. Elmendorf, 4 Bibb, 484;
and Barney vs. Brashear, 2 B. Monroe, 882, we cite at some length
from Sneed vs. Ewing and wife, 5 J. J. Marshall, 460, passages
we regard as peculiarly applicable.
"A will concerning land and slaves, in Kentucky, had been admit-
ted to probate in Indiana. Ewing and wife filed their bill in chan-
cery, in the proper Court in Kentucky, founded upon an implied
revocation of the will, and claiming the land by descent.
This claim was resisted on the ground that the Probate in Indi-
ana was conclusive until it was reversed or revoked by the proper
tribunal of that State; and that, therefore, no Court in Kentucky
had power to decree that there had been an implied revocation of
the will. To this objection the Court reply-ist. The probate was
not conclusive in Indiana. 2d, If it were, it is not so here."
"Maritime Courts decide according to the law of nations; and
their decisions, or what must be necessarily inferred from them,
will be (so far as they had jurisdiction,) as to the res, or subject-
matter, final and conclusive, wherever the law of nations is recog-
nized, and upon all persons who were interested and had a right to
be considered as parties. As the proceedings are strictly in rem,
notice served on the thing is constructive notice to all who have any
interest in it, and hence, as the jurisdiction of these Courts is ex-
clusive, and they decide on a law of universal obligation, their judg-
ment must be conclusive in the common-law Courts, to the extent
which has just been intimated, if no farther. Whether judgments
in rem, of all other Courts which decide, not according to the na-
tional, but the municipal or local law, should be equally conclusive,
we do not now consider material; for, if they be so, the probate in
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this case is not of that class of judgments. The probate may be
considered as a proceeding quasi in rem; but there is no attach-
ment of the thing or property devised, and, therefore, although all
persons interested might have made themselves parties, there was
not the same constructive notice as that given in maritime or other
cases strictly in rem. And hence, the probate, without citation or
controversey, ought not to be considered as conclusive as an admi-
ralty decision; and it may be doubted whether it should be more so
than an ordinary foreign judgment. See the reasoning of the
Supreme Court in the case of 'The Mary,' 9 Cranch, 144. But if
the probate should even be considered as any other judgment in
rem, it cannot operate conclusively on the property now in contest,
because it was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of Indiana."
"Foreign laws cannot, per se, operate extra-territorially. Lan.,
is held and alienated according to the law of the place where it is
situated; and cannot be held or appropriated otherwise than accord-
ding to the will of the local sovereign, or the lex loci rei sitce. The
United States vs. Crosby, 7 Cranch, 115; Clark vs. Graham, 6
Wheat. 577; Kerr vs. Moon, 9 id. 566; McCormicek vs. Sullivant,
10 id. 192. Yattel, book 2, ch. 8, §§ 110, 114. 'As the rights of a
nation ought to be respected by all others, none can form any pre-
tensions to the 'country which belongs to that nation, nor ought to
dispose of it, without her consent, any more than of the things
contained in the country.' Vat., book 2, ch. 7, § 80. 'How could
she govern herself at her own pleasure, in the country she inhabits,
if she cannot truly and absolutely dispose of it?' Id., § 88.
'Every State has the liberty of refusing or granting to foreigners
the power of possessing lands or other immovable property within
her territory; and, as the sovereign may refuse to foreigners the
privilege of possessing immovable property, he is doubtless at
liberty to refuse granting it except with certain conditions annexed.
Property possessed by aliens, remains subject to the jurisdiction
and laws of the country.'" Id., § 114. * * * *
"But if as to land in Indiana, the probate had been as effectual
as a probate here of a will devising land here would have been, or
as the probate in any other State, where the Courts of probate have
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jurisdiction over wills devising land, would have been as to lands
within the jurisdiction of the Court, the foregoing authorities, and
many others which might be superadde], prove that it could not
conclude the right to the land devised in this State. We will ad-
mit that a foreign will devising land in this State may be effectual
to pass the title; but then it must be executed conformably to the
law of this State. And it is clear that probate in a foreign State,
is not conclusive evidence that the will was so executed as to pass
land here. Therefore, the foreign will must be proved as an origi-
nal document, on any trial involving the title to the land in this
State, devised by it, and must, on such proof, be decided by the
Court here to be valid and effectual, unless, according to the law of
this State, there shall have been probate of it by the proper Court
here, or what is equivalent to such probate. If such foreign pro-
bate should be conclusive, when introduced incidentally, it could
not be so.when directly attacked as the foundation of a suit, or of
the defence to a suit for the land. 4 Bibb. and 10 Wheat., supra.
There is an essential difference between a probate and the effect of
a will. And the probate in Indiana, being in the nature of a judg-
ment in rem, cannot operate conclusively on land which is in Ken-
tucky. It cannot conclude more than the jurisdiction in rem gave
the Court power to decide. The consequence is that, if the pro-
bate had been (which it was not) conclusive as to the property in
Indiana, it could not conclude the rights of the parties as to the land
in Shelby. As to that land, the will was liable to be contested
whenever offered as evidence of title, unless it had been recorded
in Kentucky according to her laws; and, whenever so recorded, the
right to contest it in chancery resulted ipso facto."
In the same case, the learned Judge engages in an examination
of the statutes of Kentucky bearing upon the subject. It will be
observed the probate in Indiana was allowed in 1807. By a statute
of Kentucky, of 1797, probate of foreign wills was allowed upon
copies. Still a probate was necessary. An act of 1820 authorised
foreign wills to be admitted to record in the Clerk's office of the
Court of Appeals, without probate, but solely on a proper authen-
tication of the foreign probate. The act, after further providing that
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when so recorded, they shall have all the effect which they would
have had if they had been proved and recorded in the Courts of
the counties in which theadevised property was situate, declares:
"It shall, and may be lawful for any person who may be interested
in the lands or other property devised, by his, her, or their bill in
equity, to be filed in the Circuit Court having jurisdiction, to con-
test the validity of such will, in the same manner and within the
same time that he, she, or they could do, had the said will been
proved and admitted to record in the Court of the county where
the land, or other estate may be at the time of the recording afore-
said."
Thus, proof upon copy was allowed in 1797; while in 1820 pro-
bate was dispensed with, upon the filing and recording of an au-
thenticate'd copy of the original will with its foreign probate.
Upon these statutes, the following comments are worthy of ob-
servation: "Thus by legislative indulgence, the common law has
been relaxed in a manner obviously beneficial to those interested in
establishing and enforcing foreign wills of property in this State.
Without the act of 1797, it would have been necessary to prove
the original foreign will in the Court of the county in this State in
which property devised by it was, at the death of the testator.
Without the act of 1820, probate of an authenticated copy would
have been necessary. Now, both are dispensed with. It will not
be denied or doubted, that when a foreign will had been offered for
probate before 1797, in any Court of this State, any person inte-
rested might'have contested and resisted it; or might have filed a
bill in chancery to try its validity. It is equally undeniable, that
the same right of contestation has existed since 1797. The act of
1820, therefore, confers no new right on those who may be inte-
rested in defeating foreign wills of property in this State. It only
secures to them, beyond any question, the right which they would
have had if the act of 1820 had never been passed." * * * *
"The right to seek a decree as to the validity of the will, is not
local; it is incidental to the property and parties in this State. No
judgment decree or order, which could have been made by any Court
in Indiana, could have been effectually availing to the appellees as to
